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The debate regarding the Federal Marriage Amendment ("FMA") 
presents fundamental issues concerning the ordering of American political 
life. The issues presented include who determines the principles by which 
we order our common life together, and what those principles should be. 
This article argues that the citizens and our elected representatives ulti-
mately should determine the principles guiding our common life-not the 
judiciary-and the definition of marriage, as a civil institution, is a matter 
of foundational social order properly left to the people and their elected 
representatives. The argument progresses in three parts. First, the need for 
a constitutional amendment is explained. Second, the inadequacy of state 
constitutional amendments as a response to federal judicial overreaching is 
discussed. Third, the contours of a federal constitutional amendment relat-
ing to marriage are described. The final section responds to some objec-
tions that have been raised to the FMA. 
I. WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT? 
The need for a constitutional amendment regarding the definition of 
marriage is far from self-evident to the average citizen. Public opinion 
polls show that Americans agree that marriage should be defined as only 
the union of one man and one woman-often by a margin of two to one. 1 
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minn. This 
article reflects my involvement in the national debate over the Federal Marriage Amendment, and 
insights gained from participating in this symposium. I am grateful for the efforts of the staff of 
the St. Thomas Law Journal to insure a vigorous, yet reasoned debate of these issues. 
I. See The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, The American Religious Landscape and 
Politics, 2004 tbl. 23, http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/green.pdf (55% favor traditional 
marriage, 27% favor same-sex marriage); Dana Blanton, Majority Opposes Same-Sex Marriage, 
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0.2933.103756.00.html (June 18, 2004) (66% oppose same-sex 
marriage, 25% favor); ABC News, Washington Post Poll: Same-Sex Marriage, http://abcnews.go. 
cornlimages/pdf/95Ia2SameSexMarriage.pdf (Mar. 10, 2004) (59% believe same-sex marriage 
should be illegal, 38% believe it should be legal); see also Rasmussen Reports, 55% Said Same-
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They are less certain, however, that the United States Constitution needs to 
be amended to include this definition? Federal constitutional amendments, 
as described by Article V of the Constitution,3 appear to be extraordinary 
measures that should be reserved for matters of grave national importance.4 
In the twentieth century the people and their elected representatives 
have exercised this power twelve times, enacting almost half of the present 
twenty-seven amendments to the United States Constitution.s This number 
reflects only part of the process of constitutional change. During the twen-
Sex Marriage Issue Important, http://www.rasmussenreports.comlSame%20Sex%20Marriage%20 
November%202004.htm (Nov. 8, 2004) (60% favor legally defining marriage as union of a man 
and a woman, 30% oppose). 
2. Pew Research Center Pollwatch, Reading the Polls on Gay Marriage and the Constitu-
tion, http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=92 (July 13,2004). A variety 
of public opinion polls regarding recognition of same-sex unions and the desirability of a constitu-
tional amendment are collected in Karlyn Bowman & Bryan O'Keefe, Attitudes about Homosexu-
ality and Gay Marriage, http://www.aei.orgldocLibI2005012LHOMOSEXUALITY.pdf(updated 
Dec. 31, 2004). 
3. Article V states that: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, 
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conven-
tions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be 
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to 
the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and 
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
U.S. Const. art. V. 
4. Alexander Hamilton affirmed the right of the people to amend the Constitution, and the 
obligation of the government officials to observe Constitutional limits as written. 
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its ene-
mies in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits 
the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find 
it inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the 
representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of 
a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Consti-
tution WOUld, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the 
courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape than 
when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the 
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established 
form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no pre-
sumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a 
departure from it prior to such an act. 
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalis(Papers, No. 78, 468-70 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin 1961). 
5. Amend. XVI, Income Taxes (ratified Feb. 3, 1913); Amend. XVII, Popular Election of 
Senators (ratified Apr. 8, 1913); Amend. XVIII, Liquor Prohibition (ratified Jan. 16, 1919); 
Amend. XIX, Woman Suffrage (ratified Aug. 18, 1920); Amend. XX, Lame Duck Amend. (rati-
fied Jan. 23, 1933); Amend. XXI, Repeal of Prohibition Amend. (ratified Dec. 5, 1933); Amend. 
XXII, Limitation on Presidential Terms (Feb. 27, 1951); Amend. XXIII, Presidential Electors for 
District of Columbia (ratified Mar. 29, 1961); Amend. XXIV, Qualifications of ElectorslPoll Tax 
Amendment (ratified Jan. 23, 1964); Amend. XXV, Succession to Presidency and Vice-Pres i-
dencylDisability of President (ratified Feb. 10, 1967); Amend. XXVI, Right to Vote/Citizens 
Eighteen Years of Age or Older (ratified July 1, 1971); and Amend. XXVII, Congressional Sala-
ries (ratified May 7, 1992). 
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tieth century, the United States Supreme Court has engaged in what some 
have characterized as "judicial amendment,,6 and others have called "inter-
pretation" of the Constitution, resulting in significant changes in the charter 
governing our common political life. 
Of the 151 federal statutes declared unconstitutional in whole or 
in part by the Court between 1789 and June 2000, 40-over 26 
per cent-were declared unconstitutional since 1981. This num-
ber might be misleading, of course, because it is difficult to come 
up with a baseline figure of the total volume of federal legislation 
enacted since 1981. However, a significant number of the recent 
cases of invalidation result from wholly new doctrine or standards 
of review. It is hard to escape the impression that the Court is not 
approaching its review functions modestly, but instead actually is 
inventing new reasons for invalidating legislation.? 
The number is under-inclusive by its exclusion of state laws declared 
unconstitutional, such as the Nebraska statute banning partial birth abor-
tions,S the Texas statute prohibiting flag desecration,9 and the Kentucky law 
that provided for the posting of the Ten Commandments in public 
schools. 10 
In the first third of the twentieth century, this process of "judicial 
amendment" or "interpretation" dealt primarily with economic issues, re-
sulting in the Court striking down legislation that interfered with its under-
standing of substantive due process and the contracts clause of the 
ConstitutionY This era came to an end in 1937, however, with the political 
challenges posed by the Great Depression, and President Franklin 
Roosevelt's determination to implement responsive economic legislation-
even if doing so required dramatic changes in the composition of the Su-
preme Court via his "court-packing" plan. 12 The plan proved both unpopu-
6. Professor Raoul Berger characterizes judicial activism as a "continuing constitutional 
convention." Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 3-4 (2d ed., Liberty Fund 1997) (quoting James M. Beck, The Constitution of the 
United States (1922». Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote that when the Court refuses to let the 
"language and history of the controlling provisions of the Constitution" limit interpretation, its 
"action ... amounts to nothing less than an exercise of the amending power." Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Professor Ira Lupu argues that the 
Supreme Court should perform a "function akin to that performed in other contexts by the amend-
ing process." Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. 
Rev. 981, 1040 (1978-1979). 
7. Peter M. Shane, When Inter-branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Or-
derly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups", 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. 
Policy 503, 510 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
8. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
9. Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
10. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
11. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 1l.3, 374-75 (5th ed., West 
1995). See Michael J. Phillips, The Lochner Court, Myth and Reality: Substantive Due Process 
from the 1890s to the 1930s (Praeger 2001). 
12. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 11, at §§ 11.3, 11.4. 
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lar (the Congress ultimately voted against Roosevelt's plan for expanding 
the number of justices) and unnecessary, since the Court ultimately began 
to recognize congressional authority to enact economic legislation as part of 
the power to regulate interstate commerce. l3 
The last third of the twentieth century saw continued restraint by the 
Court regarding national economic legislation,14 but new judicial adven-
tures regarding legislation directed at protecting public health and morals. 
An example of this line of cases began with Griswold v. Connecticut, IS in 
which the Court struck down a statute that prohibited the use of contracep-
tion by married couples,16 finding that it violated the "right to privacy," 
which emanated from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 17 Ultimately too 
ethereal to withstand scrutiny while standing alone, this right found a home 
in the due process clause as a protected form of "liberty," where it expanded 
to include the rights of single adults18 and minors19 to use contraception, the 
right of women to obtain abortions,20 and most recently the right of homo-
sexual adults to engage in sodomy?1 
The [sodomy] case does involve two adults who, with full and 
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices com-
mon to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to re-
spect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitu-
13. William E. Leuchtenberg, F.D.R. 's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 
J. S. Ct. History (1988), (available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_library/subs_ 
volumesI04_cI0_m.htm1). 
14. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 
539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
16. Only four years earlier, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality), the Court had 
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the very same statute on the basis that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing because the statute was virtua1ly unenforced. 
Neither counsel nor our own research[ ] have discovered any other attempt to enforce 
the prohibition of distribution or use of contraceptive devices by criminal process. The 
unreality of these law suits is illumined by another circumstance. We were advised by 
counsel for appe1lants that contraceptives are commonly and notoriously sold in Con-
necticut drug stores. Yet no prosecutions are recorded; and certainly such Ubiquitous, 
open, public sales would m[o]re quickly invite the attention of enforcement officials 
than the conduct in which the present appe1lants wish to engage-the giving of private 
medical advice by a doctor to his individual patients, and their private use of the devices 
prescribed. 
Id. at 502. 
17. 381 U.S. at 484. 
18. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
19. Carey v. Population Services Inti., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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tion that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government 
may not enter."22 
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While some lower courts have interpreted Lawrence as denying the 
state any power to crirninalize non-commercial, consensual adult sexual 
conduct?3 at least two courts have read the opinion as a constitutional man-
date for legal recognition of same-sex unions as marriages.24 It is this inter-
pretation that requires a constitutional response by the people. 
The campaign to redefine marriage by court action began in the 
1970's25 when same-sex couples brought suits in Minnesota?6 Kentucky?7 
Washington,28 Colorado?9 Ohio,30 and Washington D.C.31 In each case the 
plaintiffs claimed a constitutional right to recognition of their unions as 
marriages. None of these initial suits were successful. 
It was only in the 1990's that litigants began to enjoy success-and 
then only through state constitutional interpretation. Based upon assorted 
theories of equal protection, privacy, and sex discrimination, judges in Ha-
waii,32 Alaska,33 Vermont,34 Washington,35 New York,36 California,37 and 
22. Id. at 578. 
23. See Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) rev'd sub nom. Williams v. 
Atty. Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004); Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 
2005) (striking down state's anti-fornication law); cf In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003) (strik-
ing down Georgia anti-fornication law as applied to teens); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, What 
Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 Sup. Ct. Rev. 27 
(2003). 
24. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 
_ N.Y.S.2d _, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Feb. 4, 2005). 
25. Human Rights Campaign, Current Marriage Cases in the U.S., http://www.hrc.org/Con-
tentlContentGroups!1ssuesllMarriage/CurrencCases.htm (accessed Jan. 28, 2005). 
26. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); see also McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 
54 (8th Cir. 1976) (increased educational benefits not available to veteran related to his entry into 
same-sex relationship); Church of the Chosen People (N. Amer. Panarchate) v. U.S., 548 F. Supp. 
1247 (D. Minn. 1982) (denying tax-exempt status to organization that had only a single-faceted 
doctrine of sexual preference and secular lifestyle, organization lacked external manifestation 
analogous to other religions, required no formal or informal education of its leaders, and con-
ducted no religious ceremonies); McConnell v. U.S., 2005 WL 19548 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005) 
(plaintiff not entitled to claim married filing joint status for federal income tax purposes based 
upon same-sex union). 
27. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.w.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973). 
28. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1974); but see Castle v. State, 2004 
WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Sept. 15, 2004) (finding state defense of marriage act violates state 
constitution); see also Singer v. U.S. Civ. Servo Commn., 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 
429 U.S. 1034 (1977). 
29. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). 
30. Irwin V. Lupardus, 1980 WL 355015 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. June 26, 1980). 
31. Dean V. D.C., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). 
32. Baehr V. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (equal protection clause requires state show 
compelling interest in restricting marriage to one man and one woman). 
33. Brause V. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) (state 
constitutional right of privacy requires recognition of same-sex marriage). 
34. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (common benefits clause requires recognition of 
same-sex unions). 
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Massachusetts38 ordered legal recognition of same-sex unions. In Hawaii 
and Alaska, the people responded by amending their state constitutions?9 
The people of Vennont wanted the same opportunity to amend their consti-
tution, but the Vennont legislature resisted,40 instead passing Act 91, An 
Act Relating to Civil Unions,41 providing all the benefits and obligations of 
marriage to same-sex couples except the title "marriage." The Massachu-
setts legislature has taken the fIrst steps toward amending that state's consti-
tution by statewide ballot in 2006, but additional legislative action must be 
taken.42 The Washington, New York, and California opinions are before 
higher courts in their respective states.43 
A. The Creation of Defense of Marriage Acts 
The immediate result of these cases was the passage of the Defense of 
Marriage Act ("DOMA") by Congress in 199644 and "mini-DOMAs" in a 
majority of the states.45 The federal DOMA defines marriage as a legal 
union between one man and one woman for purposes of all federal laws, 
and provides that states need not recognize a marriage from another state if 
it is between persons of the same sex.46 The state DOMAs also define 
marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman, and deny recogni-
tion of same-sex unions as marriages.47 The state statutes vary, however, in 
35. Andersen v. King County, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004); Castle v. 
State, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Sept. 7, 2004). 
36. Hernandez, 2005 WL 363778. 
37. David Stout, California Court Rules Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 14, 2005). 
38. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941. 
39. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning 
and Fate, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 19 (2000); Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge & William C. 
Duncan, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 Alaska 
L. Rev. 213 (2000). 
40. Cary Goldberg, Vermont Senate Votes for Gay Civil Unions, N.Y. Times A12 (Apr. 11, 
2000) (available at http://www.inform.umd.edulEdRes/Topic/Diversity/Specific/SexuaLOrienta-
tionlReadinglNews/vt.html). "No opinion poll run by a neutral organization has asked specifically 
whether Vermonters support civil unions, but the vast majority of towns that discussed the issue in 
town meetings last month opposed the idea, and past polls show that a majority, although a shrink-
ing one, opposed gay marriage." Id. See David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond 
Baker: The Case for a Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 61 (2000). 
41. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2000). 
42. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban, Boston Globe http://www. 
boston.com!news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/2004/03/30/vote_ties_civiLunions_tO-8ay_mar-
riage_ban/ (Mar. 30, 2004). 
43. Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447; Mark Fass, NY High Court Ends Session with No Decision 
on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Lawyet (Feb. 23, 2005) (available at hup:llwww.nylawyer.com! 
news/05/02/022305p.html). An appeal is expected. . 
44. Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 2, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 V.S.c. § 1738C (1996)). 
45. Kavan Peterson, 50-state Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, http://www.stateline.orgllive/ 
ViewPage.action ?siteNodeld= 136&languageld= 1 &contentId= 15966 (Nov. 3, 2004). 
46. Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
47. Peterson, supra n. 45. 
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the extent to which they deny recognition of other legal statuses afforded 
same-sex unions. Some states prohibit recognition of same-sex marriage 
only,48 while others forbid recognition of civil unions and domestic partner-
ships as welL49 The legal effectiveness of these statutes is controversiaL 
Two early challenges to the federal DOMA were unsuccessful, 50 but 
they did not involve marriages per se. Similarly, a recent bankruptcy case 
rejecting a claim for recognition of a Canadian same-sex marriage did not 
implicate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution because it in-
volved a foreign union.51 
Consensus among the legal commentators on DOMA's constitutional-
ity is not encouraging for supporters of traditional marriage. Whether the 
product of the legal profession's political preferences52 or an accurate pre-
diction of the Court's legal analysis, most articles predict a ruling that the 
federal DOMA is unconstitutionaL 53 One of the legal predicates for such a 
ruling only arose, however, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court rendered its opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,54 
declaring that state's marriage laws unconstitutional insofar as they ex-
cluded same-sex couples. 
Chief Justice Margaret Marshall opened the Goodridge opinion with a 
review of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Lawrence55 as it 
related to the centrality of intimacy in the construction of personal relation-
ships. The Massachusetts' court then opined that there is no rational reason 
supporting the traditional definition of marriage and ordered the legislature 
to include same-sex couples.56 The opinion engendered substantial public 
opposition and the Massachusetts legislature is moving forward with a state 
constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman. However, due to the amendment process in that state, the people 
will not be allowed to vote on the issue until the fall of 2006.57 
Although a Massachusetts statute prohibits issuing marriage licenses to 
non-residents whose home states would not recognize their unions, 58 out-
of-state couples flocked to Massachusetts to be married. This was due, in 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (COllll. App. 2002) (denying recognition in 
COllllecticut to a Vermont civil union); Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App. 2002) (denying 
the same, in Georgia). 
51. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 131 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
52. See Lawrence, 539 u.s. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
53. E.g. Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Un-
constitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1997); Matthew Spaulding, Will DOMA Protect Marriage?, 
WebMemo #532, http://www.heritage.orglResearch/Family/wm532.cfm (July 12, 2004). 
54. 798 N.E.2d at 941. 
55. Id. at 948. 
56. Id. at 969. 
57. Klein, supra n. 42. 
58. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 207 §§ 11-12 (2005). 
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part, to the announced intention of several town clerks to disregard what 
they characterized as an "archaic" law59 and issue licenses without regard to 
residency.60 Thirteen city and town clerks filed suit seeking to enjoin en-
forcement of the statute prohibiting the issuing of licenses to non-re-
sidents.61 A separate lawsuit to enjoin the statute was filed by eight non-
resident couples.62 Citizens representing the other side of the issue also 
sought their day in court when two private citizens filed suit to enjoin the 
issuing of marriage licenses to non-residents.63 Preliminary injunctions 
were denied in all the cases on the basis that there was no irreparable 
harm.64 Massachusetts marriage licenses of questionable validity were is-
sued to out-of-state residents until the state attorney general issued a five-
page letter to communities known to be violating the residency requirement, 
advising them of criminal penalties for such conduct. 65 
Massachusetts issued one of its first marriage licenses to a Minnesota 
same-sex couple who describe their relationship as an "open marriage," 
saying the concept of permanence in marriage is "overrated.,,66 Another 
was issued to Nancy Wilson and Paula Schoenwether, which they subse-
quently presented to a Florida court clerk requesting a Florida marriage 
license.67 Upon the Florida clerk's refusal to issue the license, the couple 
brought suit in federal district court alleging violation of their constitutional 
rights by both the federal and state governments. The United States re-
sponded that recognition was not required under DOMA, that DOMA was a 
constitutional exercise of Congressional power under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, and that there was no violation of the plaintiffs' rights to due 
process and equal protection. The federal government prevailed on all 
points.68 
59. Compl. Seeking Declaratory and Injuctive Reliefat 2, Johnstone v. Reilly, No. 04-2655-G 
(Mass. Super. 2004) (available at http://www.domawatch.org/cases/massachusetts!cote-whitacrev 
departmentofhealthandJohnstonevreilly/clerksComplaint.pdf) (consolidated with Cote-Whitacre v. 
Dept. of Pub. Health, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 190 (Mass. Super. 2004)). 
60. E.g. Issuance of Marriage Licenses in the Town of Provincetown, http://www.province 
towngov.org/marriage.htrnl (May 10, 2004); Human Rights Campaign, Massachusetts Marriage! 
Relationship Recognition Law, http://www .hrc.orgfTemplate.cfm ?Section=home&CONTENTID= 
21686&TEMPLA TE=/ContentManagementiContentDisplay .cfm (accessed Mar. 2005). 
61. Johnstone, No. 04-2655-G. 
62. Cote-Whitacre, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 190. 
63. Flynn v. Johnstone, No. 04-3136-A (Mass. Super. 2004) (pleadings available at http:// 
www.domawatch.org/stateissues/massachusetts!flynnvjohnstone.htrnl). 
64. Supra nn. 61-63. 
65. Kristen Lombardi, State of Matrimony, Boston Phoenix, http://www.bostonphoenix.com! 
bostonlnewsjeatures/other_stories/multi-page/documents/03902603.asp (June 11, 2004). 
66. Franci Richardson, P'town Ready for the 'Big Day', Boston Herald, http://news.boston 
herald.com/localRegionallview.bg?articleid=28184 (May 17, 2004) ("The couple who expect to 
be the first to receive a marriage application here on this landmark day is from Minnesota, and 
despite legal obstacles the governor has tried to enforce, they plan to marry around noon."). 
67. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2005). 
68. Id. 
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It would seem that this ruling confirms the arguments of FMA oppo-
nents that the federal DOMA and the ability of states to enact mini-DOMAs 
are adequate safeguards for the political prerogative of the people to define 
the civil institution of marriage.69 Yet careful scrutiny suggests otherwise. 
B. Cause for Continuing Concern 
Opponents and proponents of a federal marriage amendment agree that 
the United States Supreme Court has made marriage a question of constitu-
tional concern for over a century. Confronted with a claim that the free 
exercise of religion required recognition of polygamy, the Court addressed 
the role that marriage and family play in preparing children to assume their 
responsibilities as citizens in a free society, and rejected the claim.70 Suf-
fice it to say that in the intervening century, the views of those who serve as 
Justices on the Supreme Court have changed, so that the unanimous conclu-
sion of the Court in Reynolds (that polygamy can be outlawed) is no longer 
assured-as evidenced by Justice Ginsburg's writings before she took the 
bench.71 
Advocates seeking to characterize same-sex unions as marriages rou-
tinely invoke Loving v. Virginia,72 the Supreme Court case striking down 
anti-miscegenation laws as precedent for the idea that racial discrimination 
and sexual discrimination are identical, in that they are both constitutionally 
impermissible bases for limiting access to marriage.73 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found the analogy compelling. Notwithstanding 
the court's admission that its decision "marks a change in the history of our 
marriage law,"74 it equated those who support traditional marriage with rac-
ists, stating: "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither 
69. See Sen. Jud. Comm., Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View from the States, http:// 
judiciary.senate.govltestimony.cfm?id=1234&wiUd=2874 (June 22, 2004) (testimony of former 
U.S. Representative Bob Barr); see also Dale Carpenter, 2 U. St. Thomas L.J. 71 (2005). 
70. See Reynolds v. U.s., 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding federal law making bigamy a crime 
in United States territories). 
71. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Brenda Feigen Fasteau, Report of Columbia Law School Equal 
Rights Advocacy Project: The Legal Status of Women Under Federal Law 190-91 (Sept. 1974) 
(provision restricting bigamy "is of questionable constitutionality since it appears to encroach 
impermissibly upon private relationships"). Compare Chris Cobb, Polygamy, The Next Debate: 
Government Launches Urgent Study as Same-Sex Unions Open Door to Charter Challenges 
Claiming Plural Marriages are a Religious Right, The Ottawa Citizen (Jan. 20, 2005) (available at 
http://www.igs.netl-tonyc/sspolygamy.html). 
72. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
73. Id. See e.g. William Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Lib-
erty to Civilized Commitment 128-37 (Free Press 1996); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form 
or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1571 
(1997); Vincent J. Samar, Gay-Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human Rights, 64 Alb. L. 
Rev. 983, 1030 (2001). For the view that Loving is distinctive, see e.g. David Orgon Coolidge, 
Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 201 
(1998); Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discern-
ment, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 239 (1998). 
74. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
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can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but 
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."75 
Such unfounded attacks on the good faith of citizens who disagree 
with judicial political preferences unfortunately may also be found in recent 
u.S. Supreme Court opinions. In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a 
popularly enacted Colorado referendum restricting the passage of anti-dis-
crimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation to statewide enactment.76 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy speculated about the motives of 
those who supported the referendum: "A second and related point is that 
laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disad-
vantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons af-
fected.'>77 Yet as Justice Scalia wrote in dissent: 
The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifesta-
tion of a "bare ... desire to harm" homosexuals, ante, at 1628, 
but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans 
to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politi-
cally powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the 
laws. That objective, and the means chosen to achieve it, are not 
only unimpeachable under any constitutional doctrine hitherto 
pronounced (hence the opinion's heavy reliance upon principles 
of righteousness rather than judicial holdings); they have been 
specifically approved by the Congress of the United States and by 
this Court.78 
This attribution of animus emerged again in Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion in Lawrence when she suggested that the restriction of the 
Texas sodomy statute to same-sex acts was the product of a bare desire to 
harm homosexuals.79 
Regardless of one's perception of the political motivation behind the 
Colorado referendum at issue in Romer or the Texas statute in Lawrence, 
such speculation seems odd in a setting where the Court's sole task is to 
determine whether the law comports with the terms of the United States 
Constitution. It is particularly disturbing when the Court is addressing is-
sues of substantial political controversy, and lends support to Justice 
Scalia's statement that "the Court has taken sides in the culture war, depart-
ing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules 
of engagement are observed."80 
Building on the Court's statements in Lawrence equating heterosexual 
and homosexual experiences,S1 and its statements in Romer attributing ani-
75. [d. at 968 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)). 
76. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
77. [d. at 634. 
78. [d. at 636. 
79. 539 U.S. at 581. 
80. !d. at 602. 
81. [d. at 574. 
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mus to those who would make any distinctions,82 many constitutional law 
scholars have opined that the Court appears poised to mandate same-sex 
marriage in the upcoming years. In commenting on the Lawrence opinion's 
relationship to judicial recognition of same-sex marriage, Professor Lau-
rence Tribe of Harvard said "I think it's only a matter of time."83 Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky of USC has observed: "Justice Scalia likely is correct 
in his dissent in saying that laws that prohibit same-sex marriage cannot, in 
the long term, survive the reasoning of the majority in Lawrence."84 After 
the Lawrence opinion, Professor Joanna Grossman of Hofstra University, in 
her column for an electronic national legal commentary, noted: "Such laws 
[treating same-sex unions and marriage differently] have no valid justifica-
tion; they are based either on pure animus against homosexual persons, or 
on so-called 'morality' considerations that Lawrence and Romer have made 
clear cannot alone support a liberty- or equality-infringing law."85 
Counsel for the prevailing plaintiffs in Goodridge publicly attributed 
their success to Lawrence. 
The Goodridge decision "is absolutely consistent with and re-
sponsive to Lawrence," Suzanne Goldberg, a professor at Rutgers 
University Law School who represented the two men who chal-
lenged the Texas sodomy law in the initial stages of the Lawrence 
case, said in an interview. Ms. Goldberg added: "It's impossible 
to overestimate how profoundly Lawrence changed the landscape 
for gay men and lesbians." 
Professor Goldberg said that sodomy laws, even if not often enforced, 
had the effect of labeling gays as "criminals who deserved unequal treat-
ment." With that argument removed, discriminatory laws have little left to 
stand on, she said, adding that the Supreme Court "gave state courts not 
82. 517 u.s. at 634-35. 
83. Joan Biskupic, Decision Represents an Enormous Tum in the Law, USA Today (June 27, 
2003) (available at http://www.usatoday.comJnewslW ashingtonl2003-06-26-inside-sodomy-
x.htm). In commenting on the Goodridge opinion, Professor Tribe stated: 
Well, the opinion this Supreme Court rendered in Lawrence v. Texas about equal dig-
nity and respect for homosexuals suggests that after a sufficient breathing space where 
the public gets used to what the principles involved are, it would be prepared to uphold a 
decision rather like this and to reach a similar conclusion, but I doubt they would want 
to do it the day after tomorrow. 
Nat!. Pub. Radio, Professor Laurence Tribe Discusses the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts Ruling that Same-Sex Couples are Legally Entitled to Marry, Morning Ed. (Nov. 18, 2003) 
(emphasis added) (transcr. available in LEXIS, News & Business database, NPR file). Vincent 
Samar, an adjunct professor at Chicago Kent Law School and author of two books about same-sex 
unions, predicted national recognition of same-sex unions as marriages could be required by the 
judiciary in "five to six years." OnlineNewsHour, Focus: Gay Marriage (July 31, 2003) (transcr. 
available in LEXIS, News & Business database, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer file, No. 5534). 
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002,6 Green Bag 2d 367, 370-71 (2003). 
85. Joanna Grossman, The Consequences of Lawrence v. Texas, Findlaw's Writ, http://writ. 
findlaw.comJgrossmanl20030708.html (July 8, 2003). 
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only cover but strength to respond to unequal treatment of lesbians and gay 
men.,,86 
These comments proved to be far more than idle academic bravado. 
Immediately after the Lawrence opinion, marriage laws throughout the 
country came under renewed attack. In many states, same-sex couples filed 
suit asserting a constitutional right to receive marriage licenses.87 In Cali-
fomia,88 New Mexico,89 New York,90 and Oregon,91 local officials claimed 
a right to issue licenses to same-sex couples. Documents purporting to be 
marriage licenses were issued to thousands of couples residing throughout 
the country.92 Courts are continuing to sort through the legal consequences. 
86. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling with Sodomy Law 
Decision, N.Y. Times A24 (Nov. 19, 2003). 
87. See Ann Rostow, Gay Couples Sue in L.A., Fla. To Marry, http://www.gay.comlnews/ 
artic1e.html?2004/02126/4 (Feb. 26, 2004); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005); 
Deane v. Conaway, 24-C-04-005390 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Md. filed 2004) (available at http:// 
www.domawatch.org/stateissues/maryland/); Sen. Jud. Comm., Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: 
What are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial 
Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=l072& 
wiUd=3073 (Mar. 3, 2004) (testimony of Neb. Atty. Gen. Jon Bruning); Amend. Compl. of Pet., 
Lewis v. Harris, No. L-00-4233-02 (N.J. Super. L. Div. Oct. 8, 2002) (available at http://www. 
lambdalegal.org/cgi-binliowalcases/complaint.html?record=1070); Joseph A. Gambardello et al., 
Shore Town is First in N.J. to Let Gays Marry, http://www.philly.comlmld/inquirer/news/front/8l 
38474.htm (Mar. 9, 2004) (A New Jersey mayor performed a ceremony for a lesbian couple after 
Shore Town issued a marriage license to the couple in contradiction to the trial court ruling in that 
state. The mayor announced the city's intention to continue to defy the court until ordered other-
wise. The state attorney general has responded that he will seek a court order that the city stop its 
unlawful conduct.); Amend. Compl. of Pet., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 24, 2004) (available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-binliowaldocuments/record?re-
cord=I46I); see also Robert D. McFadden, Bloomberg Is Said to Want State to Legalize Same-Sex 
Marriages, N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 6, 2004); Peter Wong & Steve Law, State Supreme Court Steps 
Into Fight on Gay Unions, Statesman Journal (Salem, Or.) (Mar. 18, 2004) http://news.statesman 
journal.comlartic1e.cfm?i=77247; Pervaiz Shallwani, Gay Couple Denied Bucks [County] Mar-
riage License, Morning Call (Allentown, Pa.) B4 (Mar. 16,2004); Keptfor the Altar, The Herald 
(Rock Hill, S.c.) (Mar. 21, 2004) http://www.heraldonline.com/local/story/3436508p-3054678c. 
html; Bill Poovey, Gay Couple Ready for Marriage Battle, Associated Press (Mar. 10, 2004) 
(available at http://www.gmax.co.zalI00k04/03/11-USmarry.html); Lynn Marshall & Elizabeth 
Mehren, Same Sex Marriage Battle Moves to Seattle, L.A. Times All (Mar. 9, 2004). Cases 
collected at DOMA Watch, Index of Cases, http://www.domawatch.org/case_names_index.html 
(accessed Mar. 14, 2005). 
88. Lockyer v. City & County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
89. New Mexico Clerk Publicly Rebukedfor Issuing Gay Marriage Licenses, http://www.365 
gay.comlnewscon04/02/022404nrnFolo.htm (Feb. 24, 2004) (66 marriage licenses issued to same 
sex couples before attorney general issued opinion that such licenses would be invalid); N.M. 
Atty. Gen. Op., 2004 WL 2019901 (Feb. 20, 2004). 
90. People v. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2004); Jesse J. Smith, Charges Rein~ 
stated against West in Gay Marriage Case, http://www.dailyfreeman.comlsite/news.cfm?BRD=17 
69&depUd=74969&newsid=1387980l&PAG=46l&rfi=9 (Feb. 3,2005) (indicating that the trial 
court in West was subsequently reversed). 
91. Li v. State, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir., Apr. 20, 2004), review granted, 95 P.3d 730 (Or. 
2004). 
92. Officials in San Francisco issued 4,037 licenses to same-sex couples from forty-six 
states. Suzanne Herel et al., Numbers Put Face on a Phenomenon: Most Who Married Are Mid-
dle-Aged, Have College Degrees, S.P. Chron. (Mar. 18, 2004) http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-binlarti-
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Supporters of the people's right to define civil marriage did not stand 
idly by during this assault. State legislatures debated, and many passed, 
proposals to put the question of whether to define marriage in the state 
constitution before the people.93 Of the thirteen constitutional provisions 
voted on by the citizens in 2004, all of them passed by significant mar-
gins.94 Seventeen states now define marriage as the union of a man and 
woman in their constitutions.95 
Same-sex marriage proponents, however, are working overtime to en-
sure that the people's will does not control the definition of marriage. In 
almost every state where the people have been successful in placing the 
issue of defining marriage on the ballot, constitutional challenges have been 
brought, and gay rights activists have tried to tie the matter up in courts.96 
At this point in time, state courts appear unwilling to disturb the political 
judgment of the people,97 but these are "early returns" by a largely elected 
judiciary in the midst of, or immediately after, a contentious political year 
in which "activist judges" was an issue. Whether such judicial restraint will 
continue, even at the state level, is an open question. 
Far more dubious is a similar exercise of judicial restraint by the 
United States Supreme Court. The Court had the opportunity to forswear 
radically redefining marriage in the Lawrence case, and instead provided 
only the tepid observation that the case "does not involve whether the gov-
ernment must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter."98 This is true notwithstanding the fact that the dis-
sent argued that the logic of Lawrence leads inexorably to constitutional 
recognition of same-sex unions as marriages. 
The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of 
action, so that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual 
marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a decision that 
the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal). At the end 
of its opinion-after having laid waste the foundations of our ra-
cle.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/03/18IMNGTB5MUOIl.DTL. The licenses were subsequently held to be 
invalid by the California Supreme Court. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 473. 
93. Peterson, supra n. 45. 
94. Traditional Values Coalition, 50-State Survey of Marriage Protection Amendments, http:/ 
Iwww. traditionalvalues.org/pdCfileslMarriageAmendments50States.pdf (accessed Mar. 14, 
2005). 
95. Peterson, supra n. 45. 
96. In Arkansas, a divided state Supreme Court rejected last-minute efforts to remove the 
question from the ballot. May v. Daniels, _ S.W.3d _,2004 WL 2250882 (Oct. 7, 2004). In 
Georgia, suit was filed on Sept. 16, 2004 in Fulton County to remove the issue from the ballot. 
O'Kelly v. Cox, No. 2004CV9112 (Ga. Super. Ct. 2004) (available at http://www.domawatch.org/ 
stateissues/georgia/okelleyvcox.html). See also Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, _ So. 
2d _, 2005 WL 106567 (La. Jan. 19, 2005) (reversing trial court judgment that Louisiana 
amendment violated the single object rule); Citizens for Protec. of Marriage v. Bd. of State Can-
vassers, 688 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. App. 2004); Essig v. Blackwell, 817 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2004). 
97. See Traditional Values Coalition, supra n. 94 . 
. 98. 539 u.S. at 578. 
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tional-basis jurisprudence-the Court says that the present case 
"does not involve whether the government must give formal rec-
ognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter." Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, un-
reasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an 
earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the constitu-
tional protections afforded to "personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education," and then declares that "[p]ersons in a ho-
mosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just 
as heterosexual persons do." (emphasis added). Today's opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual un-
ions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If 
moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate 
state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if, as 
the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), "[w]hen 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring," what justification could there possibly be 
for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exer-
cising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution"? Surely not 
the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly 
are allowed to marry. This case "does not involve" the issue of 
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that princi-
ple and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. 
Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is 
SO.99 
A majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with 
the dissent, as evidenced by their opinion in Goodridge.lOo Similarly a ma-
jority of academic legal commentators seemingly share Professor Tribe's 
colorful opinion that "[y]ou'd have to be tone deaf not to get the message 
from Lawrence that anything that invites people to give same-sex couples 
less than full respect is constitutionally suspect."101 Organized bar leader-
ship also seem to understand the logic of Lawrence as mandating recogni-
tion of same-sex unions as marriages, and support that outcome. 102 
99. Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted). 
100. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941. 
101. Greenhouse, supra n. 86. 
102. See Mass. Bar Assoc., MBA Opposes Constitutional Amendment on Marriage, http:// 
www.massbar.org/article.php?c_id=6279 (Mar. 25, 2004); N.Y. State Bar Assoc., Same-Sex Is-
sues Report, http://www.nysba.org/ContentiContentGroupslReports3/Same-Sex_Marriage_Re-
portiSame-Sex!ssuesReport2004.pdf (Oct. 2004); Bar Assoc. of City of New York, Marriage 
Rights for Same-Sex Couples in New York, http://www.abcny.org/currentarticle/samesex_marrige. 
pdf (May 2001); Justin Katz, An Invidious Prohibition, Natl. Rev., http://www.nationalreview. 
com/commentikatz200410040858.asp (Oct. 4, 2004). The American Bar Association has formally 
opposed the Federal Marriage Amendment, and issued a study of the legal status of same-sex 
unions throughout the country. Ltr. from Robert J. Grey, Jr., ABA President, to Members of the 
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Given this virtual phalanx of elite legal opinion, it seems foolhardy for 
supporters of the traditional definition of marriage to await further events 
before seeking a constitutional resolution through the amendment process. 
II. THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT REsPONDS TO 
JUDICIAL OVERREACHING 
It is common to use the amendment process to correct a judicial error. 
As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, it is also proper to use the amend-
ment process to forestall erroneous constitutional decisions. Constitutional 
amendments have been ratified "in response to actual or anticipated 
decisions."103 
Examples of federal constitutional amendments responding to judicial 
decisions that did not reflect the will of the people are plentiful. The first 
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to reverse the result of 
Dred Scott v. Sanford,104 and thereby guarantee U.S. citizenship to all per-
sons born in the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment was also rati-
fied to reverse the rule of Barron v. City of Baltimore/Os which held that 
the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government. The Sixteenth 
Amendment, ratified specifically to authorize a federal income tax, effec-
tively reversed Pollack v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. 106 The Nineteenth 
Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote against sex discrimination, re-
versed the outcome of Minor v. Happersett,107 which had held that the U.S. 
Constitution, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not guarantee female suffrage. The Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment, prohibiting poll taxes, reversed the outcome of Breedlove v. 
Suttles,108 which upheld poll taxes against challenges under the Fourteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, guarantee-
ing the right to vote against age discrimination for individuals eighteen 
years old or over, reversed the outcome of Oregon v. Mitchell,109 which 
held that Congress had no authority to give 18-year-olds the right to vote in 
state and local elections. In the case of the Federal Marriage Amendment, 
the process is being initiated preemptively in order to ensure that the people 
have the opportunity to express their will on the issue. 
U.S. House of Representatives, (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/aba 
marriageltr92004.pdf (accessed Feb. 5, 2005) . 
. 103. Cass R. Sunstein, Federal Appeal, The New Republic 21 (Dec. 22, 2003) . 
. 104. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), rev'd, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
105. 32 U.S. 243 (1833), rev'd, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
106. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), rev'd, U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
107. 88 U.S. 162 (1874), rev'd, U.S. Const. amend. XIX. 
108. 302 U.S. 277 (1937), rev'd, U.S. Const. amend. XXIV. 
109. 400 U.S. 112 (1970), rev'd, U.S. Canst. amend. XXVI. 
110 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
III. WHAT SHOULD THE AMENDMENT Do? 
Assuming there is a need for a federal constitutional amendment, what 
should such an amendment do? The amendment must do three things. 
First, it must protect the most important right of every citizen-the right of 
political self-governance. This is assured by providing the states the oppor-
tunity to vote on the adoption of a constitutional amendment. 
Second, the amendment must ensure that marriage is recognized as 
only the union of a man and a woman. This is because the civil institution 
of marriage is society's means of channeling reproductive conduct into per-
manent exclusive unions to provide children, who are conceived by that 
conduct, with the necessary support of a mother and father joined together 
in a mutually supportive relationship.l1O Research establishes that, on aver-
age, children flourish when raised by their biological mother and father 
united in marriageY 1 
Third, the amendment should leave it to the states to decide whether to 
adopt alternative legal arrangements for people who are ineligible to marry. 
There are loving, committed relationships between same-sex couples, and 
others who cannot marry by law. Presently states and municipalities are 
experimenting with a number of legal devices and the creation of new legal 
statuses. It is impossible to summarize all possible arrangements. Some of 
the existing arrangements that would still be possible under the FMA in-
clude Vermont civil unions, Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries, and New 
Jersey and California domestic partnerships. Each is distinctive and respon-
sive to the concerns of the people in the state in which the laws were 
adopted. The FMA does not, and should not, preclude such experimenta-
tion by the states where it represents the will of the people, and is not im-
posed upon the people through some act of willfulness by the judiciary. 112 
IV. RESPONSE TO COMMON OBJECTIONS 
There are four common objections to the proposed FMA. Opponents 
claim that the FMA is internally contradictory, and that it prohibits private 
recognition of same-sex unions as marriages. They argue that the amend-
ment is anti-democratic because it removes the definition of marriage from 
the arena of state law and creates a uniform federal definition. Finally, and 
in contradiction to the last point, they argue that the amendment will in-
110. For an extended discussion of the characteristics of marriage see Teresa Stanton Collett, 
Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the Impossible?, 47 Cath. u. L. Rev. 1245 (1998). 
111. Maggie Gallagher & Joshua K. Baker, Do Mothers and Fathers Matter?: The Social 
Science Evidence on Marriage and Child Well-Being, http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/ 
MothersFathersMatter.pdf (Feb. 27, 2004). 
112. Compare the legislative history of the California domestic partnership act with that of 
Vermont civil unions. See Megan E. Callan, Student Author, The More, the Not Marry-er: In 
Search of a Policy Behind Eligibility for California Domestic Partnerships, 40 San Diego L. Rev. 
427 (2003). 
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crease litigation over the meaning of marriage. None of these objections 
have merit. 
A. The Amendment is Not Internally Contradictory 
The starting point for any analysis of a constitutional amendment is the 
text, with an intention to give effect to every word. 1 13 As proposed, the 
FMA provides: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a 
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution 
of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the 
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a womanY4 
The meaning of the first sentence of the FMA is clear. Opponents 
typically do not dispute this. Rather they assert the confusion arises be-
cause it is possible to read the second sentence of the FMA as allowing 
legislatures to create that which the first sentence clearly prohibits-same-
sex marriage (at least insofar as it is done, not due to constitutional impera-
tive, but rather due to some alternative legitimate legislative motivation). 
While such a reading is theoretically possible, it violates one of the most 
basic canons of construction: "The plain meaning of a statute's text must be 
given effect 'unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at 
odds with the statute's intended effect."'115 Since such an interpretation 
would render the FMA "self-contradictory" and ineffectual, it should be 
rejected under ordinary principles of construction. 
Opponents also argue that the phrase "legal incidents" of marriage is 
unclear and will require extensive judicial interpretationY6 Yet this is a 
phrase that has been used routinely in the discussion of marital rights. Jus-
tice Brennan used it in his concurring opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut. 117 
"Legal incidents of marriage" is also found in various state appellate opin-
ions that have been rendered over the past sixty yearsy8 It is a phrase that 
113. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. 
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990). 
114. Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Congo § 2 (July 7, 2004). 
115. Arnold V. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Parisi ex 
rei. Cooney V. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1995». 
116. John Hill, Gay Marriage Ban's Language Impact Debated, The Town Talk (June 13, 
2004) (available at http://www.hrc.orglTemplate.cfm?Section=home&CONTENTID=19799& 
TEMPLATE=/ContentManagementiContentDisplay.cfm). 
117. 401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971). 
118. See e.g. Perrin V. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1969); Sanders V. Altmeyer, 58 F. 
Supp. 67, 68 (W.D. Tenn. 1944); In re Marriage of Epstein, 592 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Cal. 1979); 
Baker V. Baker, 468 A.2d 944, 947 (Conn. Super. 1983); Baehr V. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,74 (Haw. 
1993) (Heen, 1., dissenting); In re Op. of the II. to the Sen., 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004); 
Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 953 (N.J. 1978); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 
712 (N.Y. 1965); Koppelman v. O'Keeffe, 535 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 
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indicates the rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities that arise from 
the legal relationship of marriage. 
The proper interpretation of the amendment is that offered by the spon-
sors and drafters: to preserve marriage as the union of a man and a woman, 
while leaving to states the question of whether to legislatively create alter-
native legal arrangements such as civil unions or reciprocal beneficiary sta-
tus for individuals who are not eligible to marry.ll9 
Fair-minded opponents of the FMA have acknowledged that the cur-
rent language is clear in its prohibition of same-sex marriage and its recog-
nition of the legislative ability to create alternative legal relationships such 
as civil unions. On March 22, 2004, Professor Eugene Volokh, who op-
poses the FMA, noted on his web log that the amended language "clearly 
lets state voters and legislatures enact civil unions by statute."120 Professor 
Cass Sunstein, another opponent to the FMA, also agreed that the state leg-
islature could pass a law to establish civil unions. l2l 
B. The Amendment Does Not Prohibit Private Recognition of Same-Sex 
Unions 
Perhaps the most creative argument of opponents is that the FMA 
would allow states and other governmental bodies to "punish religious or-
ganizations and individuals for performing or participating in religious mar-
riages of same-sex couples."122 This argument is crafted by analogizing the 
FMA to the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: 
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." The Thirteenth 
Amendment is the exception to the general rule that constitutional provi-
1988); Adler v. Adler, 81 N.Y.S.2d 797,800 (N.Y. Dom. Rei. Ct. 1948); Shipp v. Shipp, 383 P.2d 
30, 32 (Okla. 1963); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 90 A.2d 433, 435 (R.I. 1952). 
119. See Sen. Jud. Comm., Testimony on S.J. Res. 30, the Federal Marriage Amendment, 
http://allard.senate.govlissues/item.cfm?id=219463&rands_type=4 (Mar. 23, 2004) (testimony of 
Senator Wayne Allard); U.S. H.R. Comm. on the Jud., The Musgrave Federal Marriage Amend-
ment, http://judiciary.house.govlHearingTestimony.aspx?ID=212 (May 13, 2004) (statement of 
U.S. Rep. Marilyn Musgrave); U.S. H.R. Comrll. on the Jud., The Musgrave Federal Marriage 
Amendment, http://judiciary.house.govlHearingTestimony.aspx?ID=213 (May 13, 2004) (state-
ment of U.S. Rep. Robert H. Bork); see also Rahul Mehra, Professor Helps Draft Amendment, 
The Daily Princetonian, http://www.dailyprincetonian.comlarchives/2004/02118/news/9652.shtml 
(Feb. 18, 2004). 
120. Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.comlarchives/archive_2004_03_ 
21.shtrnl (Mar. 22, 2004). 
121. Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Frank: 'Who are we hurting?', http://www.washblade.coml2004/3-26/ 
news/nationallfrankcfm (Mar. 26, 2004). 
122. Memo. from David H. Remes, Covington & Burling, Proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment Raises Issues of Meaning, Reach, and Consistency with Fundamental Constitutional 
Principles 4 (Sept. 17, 2004) (available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/covington 
marriagememo91704.pdf). 
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sions are limitations on state action, rather than private action.123 Based 
upon this fact, and the absence of any language in the FMA expressly limit-
ing the amendment to state action, opponents claim that any private recog-
nition of same-sex marriages would become punishable at law. 
This ignores important differences in the language of the two amend-
ments, however. Section (a) of the Thirteenth Amendment is written as a 
prohibition, with a narrow exception. In contrast, the first sentence of the 
FMA is written as an affIrmation of the nature of marriage, with the second 
sentence limiting the ability of courts to redefine marriage in the guise of 
constitutional adjudication. Rather than a distinct provision, the first clause 
functions as an introduction to the second. There is nothing in the language 
of the FMA, or the legislative history to date, that suggests any intent to 
disrupt the current ability of religious communities to determine their un-
derstanding of marriage and divorce. 124 
Given the long history of detente between Church and State in this 
country regarding the regulation of marriage and divorce, the reasonable 
assumption is that the FMA will control governmental actions related to 
civil marriage, and religious bodies will continue to define their own entry 
and exit requirements for marriage. 125 To the extent there is any merit in 
opponents' analogy to the Thirteenth Amendment, its interpretation sup-
ports this conclusion. In Robertson v. Baldwin,126 two deserting seamen 
argued that they could not be forced to fulfill their commitment in light of 
the constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude. The Court disposed 
of this argument opining: 
It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to in-
troduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of 
service which have always been treated as exceptional, such as 
military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents 
123. Compare Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 408, 438 (1968) (Congress has power 
under Thirteenth Amendment to enact legislation to prohibit private acts that erect racial barriers 
to the acquisition of property) with Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 
(1993) (no violation of constitutional right to privacy occurs absent state interference with wo-
man's right to abortion); United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 
831-32 (1983) (state action is necessary to establish conspiracy to violate First Amendment). 
'124. See Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588 (Conn. 1972) (religious ceremony insufficient to 
constitute civil marriage); Marazita v. Marazita, 27 Conn. Supp. 190 (Conn. Super. 1967) (wife's 
religious belief in indissolubility of marriage not sufficient to deprive court of jurisdiction in 
divorce proceeding); Knibbs v. Knibbs, 94 N.J. Eq. 747, 748 (N.J. 1923) (suit for divorce due to 
refusal to marry in church); Victor v. Victor, 177 Ariz. 231 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1993) (court with-
out authority to order Jewish divorce); In re Marriage of Dajani, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1387 (Cal. 
App. 4th Dist. 1988) (American court could not enforce Islamic law). 
125. The only prosecution related to the performance of a ceremony uniting same-sex partners 
was on the basis that the ministers insisted that the ceremony be given civil effect, notwithstand-
ing that the ministers knew that the partners did not meet the statutory requirements for civil 
marriage in the jurisdiction. It was subsequently dismissed. People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 
899 (2004). 
126. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
114 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards. 
The amendment, however, makes no distinction between a public 
and a private service. To say that persons engaged in a public 
service are not within the amendment is to admit that there are 
exceptions to its general language, and the further question is at 
once presented, where shall the line be drawn? We know of no 
better answer to make than to say that services which have from 
time immemorial been treated as exceptional shall not be re-
garded as within its purview. 127 
The continuing viability of this case is evidenced by the Court's reli-
ance on it in U.S. v. Kozminski. 128 
While opponents raise the specter of organized persecution of religious 
communities that perform same-sex marriage rituals, the international expe-
rience suggests quite the opposite. It is defenders of traditional marriage 
that have cause to worry. Last fall at Outfest, a gay-pride event in Philadel-
phia, eleven religiously-motivated protestors were arrested for their at-
tempts to witness to attendees. Upon the protestors arrival, they were 
surrounded by a group of counter-demonstrators identified as the "Pink An-
gels."129 The Pink Angels encircled the protestors and held up large insula-
tion boards to block both the protestors and their signs from the view of by-
passers. When the protestors attempted to communicate their message ver-
bally, the Pink Angels blew loud whistles. The local police, who were pre-
sent during the entire encounter between the two groups, ultimately 
demanded that the protestors move away from the event. The protestors 
refused and were arrested and charged with various crimes. If they had 
been convicted on all counts, they could have been sentenced to serve up to 
47-years in jail. 130 Ultimately, however, the court dismissed the case 
against the protestors on the basis that they were exercising their rights of 
free speech.B 1 
Events in Europe are even more disturbing. A pastor in Sweden was 
sentenced to one month in jail based on a sermon opposing homosexual 
127. [d. at 282. 
128. 487 U.S. 931, 942-44 (1988) (adopting a narrow construction of coercion sufficient to 
constitute involuntary servitude). 
129. Repent America, Video Footage of the "Outfest" Arrests, http://www.repentamerica. 
cornlindex.php (Oct. 10,2004) (online video); Jason McKee, Judge Tosses Charges Against Mar-
cavage, The Del. County Daily Times, http://www.delcotimes.comlsite/news.cfm?BRD=1675& 
depUd=18171&newsid=13987075&PAG=461&rfi=9 (Feb. 18, 2005); Philly Pride Presents, 
News: The Arrest of 11 Demonstrators at Outfest 2004, http://www.phillypride.org/news.htrnl (ac-
cessed Mar. 9, 2005). 
130. Gil Spencer, The Door to Free Speech Opens Both Ways, The Del. County Daily Times, 
http://www.zwire.comlsite/news.cfm ?newsid= 1398707 4&BRD= 1675&P AG=461 &depUd= 18 
168&rfi=6 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
131. Larry Eichel, Charges Against "Phi/a. 4" Tossed, The Phila. Inquirer, http://www.philly. 
cornlrnld/inquirer/news/front/10929066.htm (Feb. 18, 2005). 
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conduct, although the verdict was subsequently reversed on appeal.132 In 
Canada, there have been criminal convictions under hate speech laws for 
publication of an advertisement opposing same-sex marriage that merely 
cited Bible verses without quoting them.133 The Irish Council on Civil Lib-
erties publicly threatened priests and bishops who distribute a Vatican pub-
lication regarding homosexual activity with "prosecution under incitement 
to hatred legislation."134 In Spain, Madrid's Cardinal Varela gave a sermon 
condemning gay marriage. He has been sued by the Popular Gay Platform 
for" 'slander and an incitement to discrimination' on the basis of sexual 
orientation."135 In England, self-defense was denied to a pastor who de-
fended himself when assaulted by several attackers while carrying a sign 
citing Bible verses regarding homosexual conduct.136 An Anglican Bishop 
in England was investigated under hate crimes legislation and reprimanded 
by the local Chief Constable for observing that some people can overcome 
homosexual inclinations and "reorientate" themselves. 137 In Belgium, an 
80-year-old Cardinal was sued over his comments regarding homosexual-
ity.138 In each of these countries what began with demands for "tolerance" 
has transformed into demands for acceptance at the price of religious 
liberty. 
A similar transformation seems plausible in light of the continuing at-
tacks on the integrity of the proponents and supporters of the FMA. Oppo-
nents of the FMA consistently seek to associate the effort of those who seek 
to protect the institution of marriage with those who sought to stabilize the 
institution of racial segregation. 139 This charge is both insulting and inac-
curate. While leadership of the African-American community may be di-
vided over whether to support the FMA at this time, they are not divided 
over whether racial segregation is desirable. Although they differ in their 
132. Swedish Pastor Sentenced to One Month's Jail for Offending Homosexuals, Ecumenical 
News IntI., http://www.eni.chlhighlights/news.shtml?2004/06 (June 30, 2004); Mattias Karen, 
Sweden: Pastor Acquitted Over Hate Speech, http://www.gay.com!news/article.html?coll=news_ 
articles&sernum=2005102/11/4&page=1 (Feb. 11, 2005). 
133. John-Henry Westen, Religious Persecution Next?, Catholic World News, http://www.cw 
news.com!news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=26363 (Nov. 1, 2003). 
134. Liam Reid, Legal Warning to Church on Gay Stance, Irish Times, http://www.ireland. 
com!newspaper/frontl2003/0802/720611077HM1POPE.html (Aug. 2, 2003). 
135. In Brief: Gay Group Sues After Sermon, Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com! 
ac2/wp-dyn ?pagename=article&contentId=A50826-2004J an2&notFound=true (Jan. 3, 2004). 
136. See Robert Knight, When You Hear of 'Civil Unions' Recall Czechoslovakia, Sweden, 
http://worldnetdaily.com!news/artic1e.asp? ARTICLE_ID=3741 0 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
137. Richard Alleyne, Bishops Anti-gay Comments Spark Legal Investigation, The Telegraph, 
http://www . telegraph.co. uklnews/main.jhtm1 ?xml=/news/2003/1111 O/nbish 1 O.xml&sSheet=/por-
taU2003/11110/ixportal.html (Oct. 11, 2003). 
138. Expatica, Rights Group Sues Cardinal Over 'Gay' Pervert Comments, http://www.expat-
ica.com!source/site_artic1e.asp?subchanneUd=48&story _id=40 15 (Jan. 26, 2004). 
139. See Remes, supra n. 121, at n. 5. 
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positions on the merits of the amendment itself, Rev. Jesse Jackson,140 Rev. 
Walter Fauntroy,141 and Hilary Shelton of the NAACP142 are all unwilling 
to equate defense of traditional marriage with racial discrimination, as are 
other prominent civil rights leaders.143 Similarly, the willingness of a sub-
stantial majority of both chambers of Congress just a few short years ago to 
vote for the federal DOMA does not equate with bigotry. Any attempts to 
do so are merely activists' attempts to cut off public debate regarding the 
need of a child to be raised by his or her mother and father. 
C. The Amendment Is Unlikely to Increase Litigation 
Marriage has become a question of constitutional law through gay ac-
tivists' unrelenting attacks on marriage statutes in the courtS.I44 Judges in 
Hawaii,145 Alaska,146 Vermont,147 Washington,148 New York, 149 Califor-
nia,150 and Massachusetts151 have already attempted to judicially impose 
recognition of same-sex unions as marriages on the people of those states. 
Lawsuits continue in numerous other states where activists either seek rec-
ognition of same-sex unions or to overturn state constitutional amendments 
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman. 
140. David Ehrenstein, The Black Divide, The Advocate, http://www.advocate.com!htmllsto-
ries/913/9133hrenstein.asp (Apr. 27, 2004); see also Harvard Law School, Jesse Jackson Reflects 
on '84 Campaign, http://media.law.harvard.edu: 8888/ramgenlsaturday _schoollspring_0412004-
02-16_ames_0200-0500b.rm (accessed Mar. 14, 2005) (online video). 
141. Maggie Gallagher, Hate Speech from Gay Marriage Advocates, http://www.townhall. 
corn/columnists/maggiegallagher/printmg200 1 0807 .shtml (Aug. 7, 2001). 
142. Sen. Jud. Comm., Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What are the National Implications 
of the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage 
Laws?, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1072&wiUd=3076 (Mar. 3, 2004) (testi-
mony of Hilary Shelton). 
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riage, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1118&wiUd=3075 (Mar. 23, 2004) (testi-
mony of Rev. Richard Richardson); Sen. Jud. Comm., What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan 
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=906&wiUd=2541 
(Sept. 4, 2003) (testimony of Rev. Dr. Ray Hammond). But see Sen. Jud. Comm., Judicial Activ-
ism vs. Democracy: What are the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?, http:// 
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It seems unlikely that the passage of the FMA, which removes the 
definition of marriage from further judicial redefinition, could increase liti-
gation beyond the present level. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Activists have been unable to succeed in changing the definition of 
marriage legislatively so they have turned to the courts. Unfortunately, 
some judges are increasingly willing to disregard the text of the laws-as 
well as the political will of the people-in judicial efforts to remake the 
institution of marriage to suit their particular political views. This is not the 
proper process to be followed in a democratic republic. It is the people and 
their elected representatives who should determine the meaning and struc-
ture of marriage-through the process of political debate and voting. 
The FMA, with its requirements of passage by two-thirds of each 
house of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states, follows 
the Founders' model for open, yet orderly change in our governing docu-
ment. The text of the Amendment is clear and preserves the understanding 
of marriage that has existed throughout this nation's history, while allowing 
for individual states to experiment with alternative legal structures as their 
citizens deem appropriate. Unlike the hypothetical threats that opponents 
attempt to manufacture, the FMA addresses real cases and real problems 
that the people of this nation are encountering with the judicial usurpation 
of the political process. 
In his first inaugural address on March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln 
warned that "if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting 
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme 
Court, ... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal."152 It is time for the people to assert self-rule again on this foun-
dational issue of how we order our common life. 
152. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of 
the United States 133, 139 (Joint Congo Commn. on Inaugural Ceremonies ed., 1989). 
